What actually are the features of mental phenomena? How can the human spirit be characterized? What constitutes the mental? (Or rather, if one prefers another terminology: What is the soul like?) The American philosopher John Searle mentions four criteria that characterize mental phenomena, namely selfconsciousness (I can refer to myself), subjectivity (cognition is always related to myself), causality (I can willingly cause something) and intentionality (the psyche always refers to "something"). I shall try to characterize the mental through concept pairs (I use "mental" as a rather broad concept). I realize that I cannot point out any feature of the mind, without immediately considering its opposite. Is this a principle of language, to emphasize something through its possible opposite, or is it rather the case that only the opposition itself makes it possible to reveal something about the mind? Such a polar labelling works differently in perception, for example in vision: What I see now does not presuppose an alternative visual object as its opposite; the alternative, the other, is rather the emptiness, the nothing, the eliminated neuronal and mental waste, the very meaningless background. Only when one visual object is defined can it itself (or its attributes, such as colour) be related to other visual objects, so that red and green, blue and orange, white and black can oppose each other. (I must confess that I am not certain about the complementarity thesis in the definition of the mind, i.e. that the mental can best be characterized through concepts of attributes that oppose each other; in spite of this uncertainty, it seems to me that this is the adequate frame to attain a better understanding of the mind, even if it is clear that there are several possible opposites for some concepts.)
What are the concept pairs of the mind?
Conscious -non-sentient [bewußt -bewußtlos]:
The state of being consäous is characterized by the fact that I am awake and that I can direct this alertness towards something and also towards myself; there are times I know of not being conscious as in deep sleep.
Conscious -unconscious [bewußt -unbewußt]:
Retrospectively, I can sometimes determine that my supposedly consciously directed actions were influenced by impulses which remained implicit, and over which I had no control.
Conscious -pre-conscious/post-conscious [bewußt -vorbewußt/nachbewußt] : I realize that the state of being conscious was related to something in the present and not to something in the past, nor anything in the future.
Subjective -dialogic [subjektiv -dialogisch] : I myself am the bearer of the mind, only I know for sure about myself; however I am I only because there are others.
Subjective -objective [subjektiv -objektiv]:
A situation is either assessed according to my personal judgement, or it is concerted with others and (scientifically speaking) validated. Subjective -distant [subjektiv -distanziert] : Some experiences are characterÌ2ed
by 1-proximity, others by 1-distancer, the inner perspective is related to my direct experience, the outer perspective is related to the objective observation.
Causal -accidental [kausal -^ufälligj: I can intentionally act upon something or cause something, i.e. be the cause of an event; or I can accidentally be at the mercy of a random event.
Active -reactive [aktiv -reaktiv] : I can willingly do something; I can actively decide for something, or I react automatically to suddenly appearing stimuli; I act instinctively, without consideration.
Intentional -tuned [intentional -gestimmt]:
It is always something that is represented in my consciousness and that I can relate myself to (I see or hear something, I believe in something); but the mind is also influenced by my 
Bodily -abstract [körperlich -abstract]:
The mental is related to the body ("embodiment"); or this bodily link does not exist. Mental events always take place in a body and therefore they are necessarily bodily grounded; yet there are those situations that are free from corporeality (or so they seem), in which one believes to have left all gravity behind. -virtual [verortet -virtuellJ: I feel myself here and now, at a particular time in a specific space; or I am placeless and I need to find my location again; virtual spaces, in which I feel estranged, let me realize that I am in fact a being connected to a location.
Located

Simple -complex [einfach -kompliziert]:
Mental events aim at simplicity, order and coherence; it is always one thing that determines the mental in a moment; when situations are too complicated and can no longer be understood without effort, then the reduction of complexity has failed, and I sink in obscurity.
And then there are further polarities, which can be regarded as complementan', such as those inherited from Antiquity: true -false, good -evil, beautifulugly. A priori, we trust the instruments of thought or the senses, and we assume that what we perceive or what we move around in thought is true and correct. What is false must first be discovered through error. The mental is also alwavs embedded in a system of evaluations, and we assume goodness to be a matter of course; evil must first be discovered. The aesthetic principle characterizes our knowledge systems in a basic way: The ugly is also of second nature and must first be discovered. But the discoveries of the false, the evil and the ugly, which breach the frame of what is given a priori, let us in turn remark the true, the good and the beautiful. If the mental is characterized by concept pairs (and many may still be missing) which of those pairs occur in a particular moment of mental events? The answer is quite simple: All of them. There is no singular characteristic of the mental, so that one could say that there is only consciousness as pure consciousness, or only anticipation, which has no attributes. The characteristics mentioned are simultaneously given attributes of the mind, which in fact can be manifested with different intensity, either conditioned by a specific situation or contingent by the kind of personal experience of the world. The different attributes provide a frame, within which the mind of each person is displayed. In other words, it is not only a set of overall valid variables that characterizes the mind of everyone (the soul of each one), but rather each person is described by the way in which the specific dimensions are fulfilled in each of us. (One could carry out a little mathematical game: If each characteristic of the mind would represent an axis in a space, and if we had, say, twenty such axes, than each person would be located as an individual point in a space with twenty dimensions; due to the several variation possibilities, this would mean that we would be distinct in our identity. There is each one of us only once.) Yet then there is the paradox: Despite all individuality, our tools for thinking are actually very similar. How is this possible, that in spite of all variation we coincide in so many things? Apparendy there was and there still is an evolutionary pressure for making us similar to each other, so that we can live together in one world, in order not to be alone. The fact that we are determined by principles of simplicity constitutes for me evidence that in the evolutionary process we are adjusted into a social system. (But perhaps this kind of evidence is questionable, for later reflection can often be deceiving;).
However one can (and in fact should) learn from error. Approximately two thousand years ago, Cicero claimed: "Cuiusvis hominis est errare, nullius nisi insipientis in errore perseverare -Everyone can err, yet only fools persist in their error". In order to better understand the tools for thinking, one has to deal with typical errors that we commit in thinking. These errors have been analysed by the founder of modern science, namely Francis Bacon, approximately four hundred years ago, in his work "Novum Organum" (Immanuel Kant dedicated his "Critic of Pure Reason" to Francis Bacon, who was above all also a politician.) According to Bacon, we can be at the mercy of four possibilities of error when thinking and when judging circumstances.
We make mistakes, because it is in our nature to do so; these are sources of error that we all share with one another. To make this point clearer I choose the example of creativity. The most important mistake that one can make in understanding creativity is to see things too simply. The human brain is default to perform a reduction from complexity (or rather complicatedness), in that simple mental categories are built simultaneously to the informational discarding of waste (this can also be called "creative forgetting"). When in a next step we try to explain a situation, after having built categories (how is something related to something else?), then we have the tendency to always look for just one specific cause. We all suffer from the disease of "monocausalitis". One has to simplify problems, but these should not be made too simple. Almost everything that crosses our path as a problem in our private and in our professional life is determined by several factors. Only because our brain would appreciate simplicity, we should not fall into the trap of expecting a specific event to have only one cause. With strategic concepts in the political framework, either of companies or in the field of law, the interdependency of effects should not be overseen. Every social system is structured like the brain: Everything is related to everything, so that a monocausal consideration is never sufficient. The search for only one factor, which should determine everything else, limits a priori the creative process.
The second source of error results from our individual nature. Each person is marked in her own way and this marking also determines our own worldview. The matrix of our brain is formed in the early phases of biography, according to the information that is processed in the brain. The frame of our experience and also of our evaluation is determined then. What we personally consider valuable or less so, is decided during this marking. The individual criteria are adjusted, our prejudices established. This individual establishment can then prevent us from being open-minded. A frame that is too fixed is an enemy of openness. Since different people use different frames of reference for evaluation, a common creativity can only be reached when one knows that one has one's own prejudices, and when one is open for the others; creative listening is also necessary.
A third way of committing errors results from communication, especially from language. It is in our nature to communicate with others; social compe-tence is inscribed in the genome, which can be seen in the fact that we dispose of a brain area that is responsible for face recognition. (When this area is lost, we then suffer from the fortunately rare prosopagnosia.) Communicative mistakes emerge, when what crosses our mind cannot be verbally or nonverbally conveyed in an adequate manner. One idea may eventually not be accepted by others, because it cannot be communicated adequately, i.e., because one cannot find that form of communication which is understood by others. Therefore, in creative communication one recurs frequendy to drawing, in order to provide the thought with a visual expression. (To avoid losing occurring thoughts, I transformed all doors in our institute into boards, where one can write and draw.) One common source of error lies in non-verbal communication, especially when the representatives of different cultures encounter one another. A particular facial expression, a way of moving can belong to a frame that is different from the one you have in mind (as I myself have experienced while talking to colleagues; when the psychiatrist and actor Mohan Agashe shakes his head in a particular way, then I first misunderstand the meaning of this Indian form of approval).
The fourth source of error, which can limit our judgement and affect our thinking, results from the opinions and theories we have about situations. For example, a theory can be the strategic concept of a company, or the political orientation of a party, or the pattern of explanation we apply to our scientific observations. In these concepts there are predetermined opinions, which establish the frame of what is right (or what is valid at the time). Creativity in science, but also in every other social system, is only achievable when we step out of the preset frame. What is new contradicts the previous frame; what is really new is a break of symmetry, which can offend others. Here, one personal factor becomes effective, which also has to do with our own nature. We all are also believers in authority; it belongs by nature to the stability of social systems that there is a vertical structure, in which authority ("leadership") is implemented. Authority is no social invention of mankind; rather the acceptance of authority or the demand for authority (certainly there are individual differences here) is a natural part of us, which is not possible to think away. When one belongs to a social system in which there is authority and "leadership" is experienced, almost everyone feels protected. However this affiliation has a price; when someone has a new thought, then it takes courage to express it. A system must therefore develop mechanisms that ensure continuity, on the one hand (it is not possible to implement permanently something creative), but where at the same time creativity can evolve. (In some social systems there is an institutionalisation of parallel thoughts, for instance as when the jester could say anything at the king's court; the establishment of "think tanks" is also an institutionalised scenario for possible creativity.)
The way in which we think about the world and the errors we may be submitted to when doing so is a result of those evolutionary processes, which eventually also produced human beings. For the analysis of the tools for thinking, this means that philosophical sentences represent an evolutionary heritage. One basis for all further reflection is the identity sentence: A = A; one thing is identical to itself. This is something obvious, and who in perfect reasoning would think of questioning such a sentence? Nevertheless we know that this sentence can lose its validity for many, as we know from several patients who suffer from schizophrenia or who have suffered brain damage. For these people, one thing can lose its identity, be something different in the next moment; even their own idendty can be lost, or they can feel that a part of their body no longer belongs to them, as in the case of the illness image of neglect (the disregard of one body side, to which attention can no longer be directed). When the identity of something that I perceive or that I think of can be lost, then there must be neuronal mechanisms in the brain which secure the identity of what is represented in consciousness. The brain must therefore provide certain programmes, so that this tenet of philosophy can hold for us as thinking and perceiving beings.
Or another sentence from the tradition of philosophical thinking, the sentence of reason: "Nihil est sine ratione -Nothing is without a reason". The discover}' of the cause (i.e. that there are causes) is one of the most extraordinary accomplishments of the human mind. (Yet one can live one's life without ever questioning oneself about why certain things are the way they are.) The sentence of reason, though, is often perceived not only in its general assertion, but rather misunderstood in its concrete form, namely in the sense of: Nothing without a reason. Here thus hides monocausal thinking. We know it, in fact; we just do not always say it: "Nihil est sine rationibus -Nothing is without reasons". Psychical phenomena, biological states, social systems, social developments are always multicausally determined.
Here a third sentence of philosophy comes into play, which also may initially seem obvious, the sentence of the excluded third: "Tertium non datur" -one thing is true or false, there is nothing in between. At a certain level of discourse this is valid, but this fundamental sentence obstructs creative thinking when it is taken literally; in many situations that do not work according to the principle of black or white, there is an aspect of in-betweenness. A person is not either good or bad, a woman is not either beautiful or ugly, a country is not either conservative or socialist; only with our concepts do we form the mutually excluding categories. Language suggests something that is not suitable for reality. If we orient ourselves only towards language, we forget that for most phenomena there is no such clear-cut basis; for the most part, what is valid is that something is more or less the case. (Of course, philosophy has reacted to most of these problems and developed a non two-valued logic.)
How did it happen that the fundaments of thinking, which are obvious on a categorical level of discourse, came to dominate the practical handling of states of affairs as well? The way I see it, this is the consequence of the heritage and especially the success of rationalism, and also of a principle which is associated with Wilhelm von Occam (known as Occam's razor): "Entia praeter necessitatem non sunt multiplicanda -One should not seek to explain states of affairs beyond what is necessary"; the simplest is valid. When the Occamian razor and the above mentioned sentence about sufficient cause ("Omnis ens habet rationem") are combined, a paradigm emerges in the sense of Thomas Kuhn, and a limitation of science and creativity; states of affairs are then well explained when they are explained simply, and their most simple explanation is a monocausal one. For complex systems like life processes, neural processes in the brain or all structural processes in which several variables influence each other, this is obviously false (or at least misleading).
René Descartes, one of the fathers of rationalism, was also concerned with the analysis of the tools for thinking. He formulated four rules of thought, which (should) determine our mental life. The first rule says that problems ought to be handled with clarity and without prejudices (and also without haste, something which is often forgotten); the second rule claims that one should divide a problem in its parts; the third, that one should go from the simple to the complex; and finally, the demand for completeness, that is to say, nothing should be forgotten. In this slightly retrospective listing (which one certainly should take to heart when filing one's taxes) the most important aspect is that one can actually really embrace it. One could speak here of the ideology of rationalism: Problems can be solved if one does it right, and one does it right when one acts with reductionism, i.e. by dividing the problem into its parts. The basic thesis of this rationalism says that states of affairs can be explicitly described and explained. Problems need to be formulated clearly and articu-lately; the engagement with them leads to transparent and comprehensible solutions. The ideal picture of this manner of thought is that problems can be formally described and solved in mathematical language. One presupposes mental categories that are unambiguously defined ("tertium non datur") and are hence formally describable. Formal algorithms can then be indicated for the solution of problems.
The algorithmization of the mind, i.e. of our tools for thinking, is remarkably associated with the classical research in artificial intelligence. One fundamental tenet of this theory was the assumption of symbolic systems, i.e. of the unequivocal possibility of characterizing mental operations. Symbols that stand for mental categories allow the algorithmization of conscious processes. This was the claim; yet the respective attempts of this classical research in artificial intelligence to transform the human mind into a mathematical formula failed. In the meantime one has attained the insight (in fact, this does not apply to all those who are doing scientific work in this area) that mental processes cannot be simulated through sequences of data processing, like in a computer, simply by conducting sequential operations with symbols. The fact that one could come to the idea of considering thinking as algorithms implemented in a computer proves the sustainable effect of rationalism as a paradigm claiming that everything can be named clearly and explicidy, that problems can be solved rationally, especially when one acts in a reductionist manner. The frame of this thinking about the human mind turned out to be too narrow.
Sometimes science cures itself. Notably, the change in the consideration of the mind emerged from researchers whose working field was not very far from that of artificial intelligence, namely cognitive robotics. What would a world look like in which there were not only natural beings, but also artificial beings, i.e. robots? Naturally, robots would have to be built in such a way that they would adapt to our behaviour. In the world in which I would like to live, it is not desirable that human behaviour should need to adapt to that of robots. (Nevertheless, should this ever be the case, namely that robots should exist in our social world, it will not be possible to prevent that we ourselves adjust somewhat. It only takes a look at the street to see that we can succeed at this. What we observe is the interaction between people and cars and not between people and people in cars. A moving car is perceived as an object/subject that we avoid or that we await. Hence, in our behaviour we adjust to the traffic when we "humanise" traffic objects like cars or buses.) Let us imagine that robots, like the humanoid robot Asimo from Honda, circulate on the sidewalk. We would expect from Asimo that he draws aside as he goes by, the same way we avoid walking towards him. His movement trajectories must be designed in such a way that they hardly rank behind our own avoidance behaviour. In order to achieve this, Asimo must be provided with an intelligence, which perhaps does not need to approximate human intelligence, but which must be much greater than what robots have today. Cognitive robotics, the field that has proposed itself the task of bringing higher intelligence to robots, must install a kind of world knowledge in robots. For this, it would be useful if for example an algorithm could be implemented, which Kerstin Schill has developed under the name of IBIG ("Inference by Information Gain"). (Act in such a way that with the next step a maximal information increase can be attained; if each one acts accordingly, then behaviour can be predictable by others, at least within a certain frame; and then one can avoid others while walking.)
Below such a level of intelligence, some additional measures must be considered: A robot needs to be equipped with sensors that inform it about where something is and in which direction a person or another robot moves. Acoustic and optical stimuli must be processed as information, and perhaps even olfactory stimuli, for the shaping of reactions towards people. The robot also requires a center for information processing, in which stimuli from different domains can be integrated, so that it can adjust its movements according to this basis. However the stimuli from different sensorial domains must not only be assembled; they must also be assessed as to whether they are relevant for the guidance of movement. Such a robot therefore needs a good memory, only on the basis of which such an assessment is possible. Every autonomous being has an assessment device; when robots are built to interact with each other and behave autonomously, but consider each other reciprocally, they need to have an assessment device implanted in them. They must be informed at any moment about what is good and what is bad for them. In this sense, autonomous moving robots must also have feelings, even if these are unconscious to them. And even if all this has been fulfilled, they still need a knowledge of themselves being able to do all this; therefore they do not need a "theory of mind", but they must rather be able to behave appropriately like a guide dog, which probably also has no knowledge about its own skills either. (A "theory of mind" develops in humans at about three or four years of age, i.e. when one realizes that others also have knowledge about the world, that one can direct one's gaze together with someone else's towards some things, that one can have an external perspective over things, that one can have an explicit knowledge about oneself, or that one can delude someone; being able to lie, i.e. to wilfully conceal the truth, is a particular human accomplishment; however the behaviour researcher Konrad Lorenz believed that dogs are also capable of lying; perhaps we humans are only better at it.)
One scenario about not yet existing but perhaps eventual robots, living in our social world, cannot be dismissed as an illusion of the future, when one considers a mechanism that is characteristic of humans. This mechanism of attribution leads us to recognise objects as being alive, and to perceive them as experiencing beings. When we see a moving object, we ascribe life to it, even if it is quite obviously a machine; we cannot do otherwise than perceive moving machines as animate. This human peculiarity has the consequence that the features that characterize ourselves are transferred to technical artefacts. We also populate our social world with inanimate beings. The peculiarity of considering our own creations as living and animated is named the Pygmalion effect, after the figure of the artist in Greek mythology who fell in love with his own work and who implored the Gods to provide it with life. (The Gods did in fact fulfil this wish.) The Pygmalion effect, to which we all succumb, determines that virtual realities are considered real; robots that look like ourselves and that move as we do are sensed as being alive and animated.
It seems to me that the Pygmalion effect also is relevant in the field of philosophy. A central question in philosophy is how one could ever know that another person is animated, just as oneself. Due to the subjectivity of experience, one is enclosed in oneself and can therefore only presume but not know, whether another person has the same or similar experiences as one's own. The mechanism by which we attribute human characteristics to others leads us to ascribe life and experience to others. One experiences others a priori as persons and does not have to previously meditate upon it. The other is not constructed, he already is. Why are so many people (not all) fascinated by the possibility of rebuilding the human mind in terms of computer programs? Why do we look for algorithms of the mind in order to describe our thinking formally? Besides the scientific challenge, it is especially the wish for immortality that hides behind it. It is therefore a religious endeavour that we should live on as computers. Our life and experience is connected with the functional capacity of the brain and with the corporeity of our being. If one can develop mathematical programs that represent our mind, then one can in principle also make a copy of our mental life. One can then embed this copy in matter that disposes of a longer physical existence than our bodily life; we would then finally be absolved from the corporeity of our existence. Such a view of the algorithmization of everything mental emanates from the dualism with regard to the body-soulproblem, i.e. from the principle of the separation of mind and body; for a representative of functionalism it is indifferent whatever material basis the soul has; it can be technically fulfilled in any way.
Although most natural scientists (both male and female) stand for a monistic notion in the explanation of the body-mind-problem, it is worth considering how dualist thinking could emerge at all. A way of thinking that separates the body from the mind does not seem obvious to me (but perhaps my personal bias is hiding somewhere in this judgement). Historically, the development of a dualist position may be related to the discovery of written language. When we write something down, thoughts we have expressed are separated from the moment in which they were uttered. Through written record, the considerations emerging in direct communication are made available in another place at another time. The written document is however not only a repository of the spoken word. In the moment of separation from the immediate communication, the fixed, written words and thoughts begin to lead their own life. The reader begins to believe that what was fixated through writing is not a mere record of what happened in an interpersonal communication; the word rather represents something generally valid, behind the word stands an idea, which thus acquires an independent existence. As long as this word reference directs itself to objects that are available in our sensorial experience, this category reference is not problematic. Everyone can verify that there is a chair or a book or a bed when one is sitting or lying reading a book. Problematic is this category reference when the written word relates to abstract concepts like consciousness or soul. Such concepts with an abstract reference are initially word casings that serve the facilitation of communication. It is a mistake to conclude from the possibility of writing the word "consciousness" that this concept would correspond to a reality similar to that of a chair, a book or a bed. Through the separation of the concept from the spoken word and through its written fixation, we are tempted to assume that there should be a consciousness in the actual sense of the word. Then, it can be the case that some neuroscienrists set off searching for the place of the soul; a senseless endeavour. This way of thinking is grounded on a misunderstanding about language and its possibilities.
This should not imply the dissuasion from the use of the word consciousness. Even less can one renounce to using words that relate to other abstract concepts, which play an important role in psychology and neuroscience, like feeling or attention. When using these words, one should keep in mind that they are functional words that refer to processes of experience. However they should not mislead to the assumption that there might be something like the intelligence, the attention, the feeling or the consciousness, just like there are those things that are evident to our view and that we can understand because we can actually grasp them. In all these cases, particularly in the misunderstood usage of the word soul or consciousness, the result is a set of far-reaching consequences, which mark and have marked not only our social life, but also the course of history. Actually, when we consider consciousness as something separated from the body, we hope that this area, which is connected with our bodily life, prevails when we bodily die. We long for our bodily mortality to be overcome by the soul through the participation in the everlasting cosmos, and in many religious systems one even wins back an eternal corporeality.
These considerations also demonstrate how nonsensical the question is of where consciousness is placed, when we sink into dreamless sleep. According to the dualistic notion, this question must cause concern; consciousness should then be stored somewhere. For a monist, this question is not meaningful. The state conscious is always created anew in die process of awakening. It can then necessarily happen (and this is experienced by many as surprising) that the feeling of one's own identity does not immediately appear while awakening. The impression of an I-estrangement can persist (and strangely this happens exactly when we wake up in a foreign bed; in a foreign environment one often knows neither where one is nor who one actually is). This I-estrangement points out the fact that the feeling of self identity is not something obvious. Our processes of perception, our memories, our evaluating feelings and our deliberate intentions must first be connected with each other, and when it comes to certain hesitations in the connection between the neural modules that underlie those functions, then a state of I-estrangement can emerge, even in a healthy person, in the transition phase between sleep and wakefulness.
The question is often raised of what functions dream sleep and dreams could have. One can ask oneself (and one should also do so), what meaning dream sleep has before birth, since the unborn child spends most of the time in a state of dreaming. I suggest the following hypothesis for the pre-natal sleep (and it is shared by some but not all experts; when the American sleep researcher Allan Hobson came for a visit, I told him about my speculations, and I was glad to finally meet someone who thought similarly; one would not like to be alone with certain theses): Dream sleep represents phases in which the brain processes visual information as virtual information. These are states oí as if, by which the brain is prepared immediately after birth for the processing of visual information. This purely neurobiological explanation of the function of dreaming is opposed to the one that allocates to dreams a function relating to psychic hygiene. In the latter, non-biological interpretation there is a physiologically and unequivocally defined state, which developed in the course of evolution, in such a way that in another field of consciousness, namely the dream consciousness, psychic realities could be fulfilled that are also useful for the awakened consciousness. Thus Carl Gustav Jung, for example, assumed that dreams inform the awakened consciousness about what deficits exist, in the life and experience of the individual, that should be considered for the subsequent life configuration. Dreams here acquire a self-therapeutic function.
The theory of dreams of Sigmund Freud can be regarded as complementary to the biological theory about the function of dreams. Freud considered dreams as a privileged pathway to the unconscious; in our dreams, suppressed contents of experience are revealed in a concealed manner. In the biological state of dreaming, a stage is built, the dream consciousness, on which the individual operates as an actor, director and spectator. Freud assumes that in this phase of reduced self-control, hidden motivations usually come to the surface. This access to the surface is explained by the fact that mental activity in this physiological state remains uninfluenced by sensorial experience. The brain has made itself impermeable for stimuli from the outside. Although now suppressed contents are allowed onto the stage of the dream consciousness, they must disguise themselves. The so-called latent 'dream thought' is transformed into the experienced dream with the help of 'dream work', as Freud calls it. The disguising of the actual dream intention happens with the help of several mechanisms that are familiar to every dreamer. The mechanism of condensation causes two persons to be concentrated in one; the displacement mechanism results in the fact that an actor on the dream stage can stand for another person; and the mechanism of symbolization means that an object in the dream can represent another thought or desire. For many it is remarkable, and this may have been the case in earlier times more often than now, that sexual symbols furnish the stage. What lies beneath social ostracism is suppressed in the unconscious, and so in dreams it attempts to push itself onto consciousness again. Since the measures of value diverge in different cultures and at different times, different courses of action and their correspondent fields of experience are given different acceptance. The greater acceptance of sexuality in contemporary times may be the cause of the fact that the dream stage of today is empty of sexual symbolism, or at least that this symbolism is less frequent.
The bizarre nature of dreaming has to do with the fact that during dreaming the activity of the brain is disconnected from the activity of the sensory system. With its tools for thinking, the brain is actually left with its own resources. Such states of self-activity, in which the control of reality through the sensory system is missing, also exist in other mental states. In the case of the disease of schizophrenia it can be the case that sensorial experiences no longer are connected to the brain's own activity; this abandoned activity can lead to hallucinations. The disconnection of the activity of the central nervous system can be made accessible to experience in experimental sensorial deprivation; when one subjects a person to an environment in which she no longer sees or hears anything, the person will soon lose the sense of space and time; due to the activity left to its own resources, she will soon begin to hallucinate. These observations reveal that our consciousness is embedded in our world experience, which is ensured by the activity of our senses. Perception is a constitutive element of every consciousness, and thinking, as detached from the world as it may seem, is ultimately always linked to the world or to ourselves; when this link is missing, then I at least sense such thinking as strange.
Around the turn of the century I received a call from a gentleman who wished to talk to me about neuroscience and thinking; we met at the Italian restaurant on the corner, drank a botde of wine to our lunch and talked about how thought might have come to the brain at all. This and further discussions with Albrecht von Müller developed their own dynamics, in which we both wondered about non asked questions in philosophy and especially in neuroscience. It is evident (this is my personal estimation), that there were, and there are, hardly any efforts in my own research field that aim at a more profound understanding of what we understand as thinking. An activity that one performs coundess times in a day is not a topic in neuroscience, and if it ever was a subject (as perhaps one hundred years ago with the psychiatrist Emil Kraepelin), then it disappeared as a subject (to this assessment of mine many reply that nowadays we talk about "cognition" and no longer about "thinking"; however, to me these notions are not the same; I associate thinking with a process in the brain; the concept of "cognition" lacks this dynamic aspect). We decided already on this first meeting to join forces, and under the protecting name of the pre-Socratic philosopher Parmenides we have since then carried out several conferences with colleagues from around the world, in which we dived into the question of what thinking is really about. Many of these events took and still take place on the island of Elba, a place that itself invites thinking, and where Napoleon stayed for some time. (In one of the conferences, the American philosopher Hubert Dreyfuss surprised us with a palindrome, i.e. a word or a phrase that can be read equally in both directions, having the same meaning: "Able was I ere I saw Elba"; Napoleon was indeed particularly able, before he saw Elba.) For me, the most productive meeting so far was a "scuola di primavera" (a "spring school"), in which many young researchers took part, and in which the academics Georg Kreutzberg, Albrecht von Müller and I tried to provide insights into neuroscience. The participants came from East and West, and the atmosphere was dominated by the mood of thinking. Martin Hirsch developed further his considerations for the recovery of information from texts; he is concerned with the acquisition of knowledge with meaning; Sepideh Ravahi, with her pragmatic sense, considered the reference to reality, namely that thinking is not free from its emotional frame; Britta Glatzeder and I attempted to determine the content of thoughts with a new artificial noun "think" ("Denk"); Albrecht von Müller discussed his theory that thinking is characterized by comparative, sequential, causal and gestalt-forming fundamental operations; thence everyone was a part of the intellectual process, which was not even interrupted by eating or swimming.
How did we come up with this strange word "think" ("Denk")? In every mental activity there are contents, and such is the case of thinking as well (to have a completely empty mind is something only few succeed in achieving). But what are the contents of thinking, what is the object of thinking? If one says it is thoughts, this concept already seems too global; there is apparendy no concept for the materials of thinking (perhaps I am just not aware of it). In I E. PÔPPEL thinking, elementan -blocks of mental activity must be made available; we named these individual blocks or categorical elements the "think" [das "Denk"] (without a certain amount of humour, also when treating concepts, these meetings would be no fun).
Back then in the "scuola di primavera", just as it does today, the fundamental question emerged: What is the purpose of thinking? Why do we think at all? (Susanna Piccone even devoted a nice evening meal to this question in her Denk-Bar.) As expected, there was and still is no unanimous answer to the question of why we think. I came up with a simple answer for myself, which draws on homeostatic regulation: Thinking serves the purpose (and ultimately only the purpose) of holding our organism in a dynamic balance. Thinking is at the service of this life maintaining function. When needs emerge, this notifies us that the inner balance is in danger. Then the needs must be satisfied, even if this cannot always happen immediately, i.e. when there has to be a pause (a hiatus, as Arnold Gehlen called it) between the mental representation of the need and its satisfaction. To mentally act out solutions for a possible satisfaction of one's needs (one could call it action rehearsal, as Sigmund Freud did), is to think. Every organism tries to keep a homeostatic equilibrium and to restore it when it is disturbed. For this purpose, human beings have developed one skill particularly well, if compared with other beings, and that is the skill we call thinking.
